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Abstract 
Ongoing developments continue to effect the provision of ACC for those in the rural workforce, particularly 
the levying of shearing contractors in the wool industry. Atypical high wage transaction costs for 'contract 
employers' problematise the non-wage cost of individual employers' liability levies. Modem relations of la-
bour between shearing contractors and their workers are largely injonnal. The fluidity of workers entering 
and exiting the industry is one part of the fluidity, as it is for contractors entering and exiting the industry. This 
paper focuses on exposing these contradictions to collapse the assumption of a binary contractual relation-
ship between shearing industry parties in the provision of 'workers' compensation' in woolshed relations. 
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Over the past one hundred and forty years the New Zea-
land wool industry has made a rich contribution to the pri-
mary sector of the New Zealand economy. However, in 
recent years the relative importance of rural labour from 
the primary production sector has diminished relative to 
other sectors of the economy. One of the consequences of 
the changing nature of the rural economy is variable impli-
cations of government policy in an increasingly regulated 
framework. This can be illustrated in the wool industry as 
a significant reduction in the rural workforce through tech-
nological and social changes. Despite this reduction there 
is one key group in raw wool production services, shearing 
contractors and workers, that illustrates the changing na-
ture of the labour force in relationship to a changing legal-
ised framework. This paper is drawn from current Masters 
research that investigates the New Zealand accident com-
pensation scheme 1 through an analysis of law and policy, 
raising contradictions inherent to the provision of ACC in 
the wool industry. It is important to note that the imple-
mentation of the government's ACC policy is intercon-
nected to other legislation, specifically the Health and Safety 
in Employment Act 1992 (hereafter RASE) and the Occu-
pational Safety and Health (OSH) service monitoring 
workplace environments. 
Government policy 
There has been an increase in critiques of government ac-
cident compensation policy, specifically worker's compen-
sation over recent years (Campbell, 1996; Palmer, 1994; 
Duncan, 1993: 1995). Several from a policy perspective can 
be found reflecting on the impact of structural adjusnnent 
programmes, or hypothesising on the direction of govern-
ment policy (Duncan, 1995; StJohn, 1998). All these exist 
within a growing literature on the socio-economic envi-
ronment of policy analysis in New Zealand (Bollard, 1994; 
Williamson, 1995). However, there has been little empiri-
cal work done on the New Zealand scheme over the past 
twenty years (Palmer, 1994:252).2 
Woodhouse Report 
The genesis of the ACC scheme is found in the Royal Com-
mission of Inquiry on Compensation for Personal Injury in 
New Zealand, and subsequent Select Committee consid-
eration of the Report (Fahy, 1984:5). New Zealand aca-
demic reviews of workers' compensation have tended to 
focus on the historical emergence of the ACC scheme from 
the WoodhouseReport, 1967 (ACC, 1988; Campbell, 1996; 
Fahy, 1984;Miller, 1989; Palmer, 1994). The Commission's 
terms of reference related mainly to employment associ-
ated claims for compensation and damages arising from 
accidents at work sites, as well as medical care, retraining 
and rehabilitation. 
Traditionally workers' compensation was contextualised 
within employment law, either through interpretations of 
the appropriate legislation, or through the common law 
adversarial route to dispute settlement. From the outset the 
report labelled the avenue of a right to sue under a negli-
gence action as a form of lottery.3 Legal solutions derived 
from the adversarial system were seen as inadequate 
(Palmer, 1979; Fahy, 19804:8). Damages rising from the 
courts produced an adequate indemnity for a small group 
of injured persons, while the Workers' Compensation Act, 
1900 provided meagre compensation for workers only if 
the accident occurred at work (Fahy, 1984:8). 
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In a modem nee-liberal policy environment the 'policy 
creep' of notions of welfarism equating workers' compen-
sation to a benefit, for example universal versus targeted 
provision of ACC, is a disturbing trend. For example the 
suspension of the right to sue delivers the current employer 
a significantly cheaper fo rm of third party liability, in terms 
of transaction costs, as well as for tort liability compara-
tive to western trends (Goddard, 1998). This is because of 
current restrictions preventing liability claims for negligence 
or damages. There are recent claims that the principleg4 
endorsed by the Commission of universal , ' no fault' , com-
prehensive entitlement, complete rehabilitation, real com-
pensation, and administrative efficiency on the basis of 
community responsibility, are outdated elements.s 
It is my contention that tampering with the scheme would 
raise questions of the suspension of the right to sue crite-
ria, despite assurances from government for this essential 
element of accident compensation policy to be retained in 
its current fonn. There is a school of thought in legal cir-
cles that government cannot achieve its reform objective6 
unless by moving to individualised liability rules7• After 
the introduction of the Accident Rehabilitation Compensa-
tion Insurance Act 1992 (ARC!), Sir Geoffrey Palmer ques-
tioned the legislation on a point of fairness8: 
"arguments have been made in New Zealand that the 
government, by reducing the benefits but keeping the 
common law from returning, was in breach of a social 
contract made at the time of the scheme's inception. " 
Such a concern is founded on the principle at the inception 
of the ACC scheme, that comparable benefits to the com-
mon law would be returned to the claimant.9 Since ARCI 
and subsequent regulations have implemented specific roll-
backs on compensation benefits (Palmer, 1994: 251), and 
the common law remains unavailable, the public provision 
of ACC as an intact scheme in the future remains unclear 
(New Zealand Law Society, 1997). 
The shearing industry 
Rural employers and employees have considerable concerns 
about the inequity of the present delivery of accident com-
pensation. For example the provision of ACC to many par-
ticipating in the New Zealand wool industry would con-
tend that neither the producer (self employed farmers), the 
employer (the contractor) nor the worker (over 5000 shed 
staff) among others, are satisfactorily provided real com-
pensation and complete rehabilitation by the ARCI Act. 
I contend that the delivery of a publicly provided workers ' 
compensation scheme is problematic in a rural context for 
three reasons. Firstly, the scheme emphasises its inadequacy 
to cater for wool industry parties through the collapse of 
the formal contractual relationship between parties in the 
rural sector. Secondly, the introduction of experience rat-
ing as policy that is inherently inequitable for 'contract' 
employers, Such employers are levied on their 'permanent' 
staff, as opposed to levies imposed on other parties who 
may or may not be 'pennanents'. Thirdly, in a period where 
the wool industry is in rapid decline, shearing contractors' 
ACC levy increases have been passed on to producers, 
thereby increasing producers' costs. Consequently, not only 
have the employers' cost margins been affected, but it is 
possible that a significant proportion of workers have had 
wage stagnation because of the economic 'climate ' created 
by progressive rises in the employers ' ACC levies since 
1994. It is in such a climate that contractors have been re-
luctant to support workers' claims for pay rises that may 
further increase wool production transaction costs. '0 The 
relationship between the three parties accords complexity 
to the provision of ACC in the shearing industry, as in the 
overall context of the rural sector. 
Labour Characteristics 
Both Martin (1991) and Merritt (1987) have explored his-
torical relations of labour, in particular the characteristics 
of workers in shearing teams. Within the wool industry 
employment has always been casualised and itinerant. Mod-
ern relations of labour between shearing contractors and 
their workers remain largely informal. The fluidity of work-
ers entering and exiting the industry is one part of the flu-
idity, parallel to contractors entering and exiting the indus-
try. Furthermore, many shearing contractors are simulta-
neous workers and employers. These relationships are made 
more complex by relations between contractors and pro-
ducers (sheep fanners) also being informal arrangements. 
Some contractors are simultaneous farmers and shearers. 
However, the assumption of labour as a formal contractual 
relationship is inherent in the legalised environment of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991. Both the ECA and ARC! 
legislation are problematic for the shearing industry be-
cause of the assumed binary contractual relationship as the 
basis for the workers' compensation funding by employers 
as 'experienced rated' levies. 
Experience rating 
The rating of an employer is detennined by the actual claims 
experience of the industry group (ACC, 1995). Atypical 
high wage transaction costs for employers in a high risk 
industry problematise the non-wage cost of the employers' 
li ability levy. Further, the industry has a relatively high 
turnover of employers which, in terms of the ACC premi-
ums, has the effect of burdening those employers who are 
committed to the primary industry for the long haul. This 
will continue to be a problem in a competitive environ-
ment, at the expense of those members unable to attract 
competitive rates on the grounds of unavailable data to 
challenge suspected incorrect experience rating inherited 
from the current 'providers'. 
For example, the New Zealand Shearing Contractors As-
sociation is concerned that their 'premiums' have been sepa-
rated from producers (fanners) for the past two years, cre-
ating a false divide between the provision of 'contract' and 
'open' levies on shearing shed staff. The effect of the 'pre-
mium based' compulsory levy scheme has been to see that, 
as employers committed to primary industry production in 
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New Zealand, there are substantive financial burdens on 
those permanently contracting 'professional' staff than for 
'open' contractors or farmers employing 'casual' staff. 
Experience rating as inequitable ACC policy affects only 
'contract' employers in the shearing industry who are then 
deemed part of a 'high risk liability' category. This distinc-
tion is an unsustainable economic burden for two reasons. 
First, fanning in general, and some agri-business indus-
tries in particular, are inherently high risk operations. Such 
risk may be derived from fann workers interacting with 
natural elements, with unpredicmble livestock, or as in the 
shearing shed, a mixture of both these factors. As uneasy 
'liability' companions, shearing contractors axe categorised 
with forestry contractors and top dressing pilots by ACC in 
one of the highest rating accounts- category 02120. 
Second, experience rating has been a costly experiment for 
some rural employers where a tension operates between 
permanent and casual woolshed labouring. Shearing con-
tractors operating in a 'contract' framework are liable for a 
6.1% levy, whereas 'open' casual shed staff can be em-
ployed at a 2.67% levy (paid by the farmer or self employed 
contractor/worker). 11 The levy for shearing contractors has 
been increased 95% in the past three years by ACC. 12 
Economic Bnrdens 
There is no question that "it does not make economic sense" 
for continual increases of the levy, particularly given that 
these costs impact on a declining industry. 13 In an industry 
that prides itself on being cost-plus, where shearing shed 
workers ' wages remain true to the historical piece-rate con-
ditions of a century ago, the non-wage labour cost that ACC 
imposes seriously undennines accounlabi1ity and efficiency 
in wool production services. Contract shearing is a busi-
ness that operates approximately 80% turnover in wage 
transactions, thereby exposing a greater proportion of turno-
ver to ACC levying than perhaps a fanner whose wages 
cost is significantly less. 
Accident Insurance Bill" 
In their submission on the Accident Insurance Bill 1998 
(the Bill), the New Zealand Shearing Contractors Associa-
tion addressed several fundamental premises creating ge-
neric fault in the Bill. Their submission did not follow the 
Bill on a clause by clause basis, but rather from the point of 
view of identifying potential risks for members, examined 
principles implied within the general scheme for providing 
'privatised, competitive' employers' third party liability 
cover for work related accidents. The submission did not 
address the specific needs of the self-employed. An em-
ployers ' third party liability for personal injury in the 
workplace is an entirely separate issue from a self-employed 
person purchasing personal cover for these elements, al-
beit incorporating the three principal elements of workers' 
compensation: 
wage replacement cover 
rehabilimtion provisions 
return to work incentives 
The Bill is based on the assumption and philosophy that a 
'competitive' environment whereby employers will have 
a 'privatised cover for third party injuries' will minimise 
·costs of injuries to society. This claim is based on the in-
surer minimising the costs of the insured, ostensibly by 
aggressive claims management and dis-entitlement to a third 
party. These premise that the insurer controls the insured 
in the 'market' for insurance covering 'personal injury in 
the workplace'. 
The unique nature of the shearing contractors illustrated a 
rare employers' group in discord with these premises. Their 
stance was a twofold critique based on the need generally 
held by critics of the Bill that, on the one hand the public 
submissions required a longer review period than the two 
weeks given, and on the other, requesting some foundation 
that substantiated the fundamental premise the legislation 
is changing to minimise employers' costs. 
Ironically the explanatory note to the Bill contains a pre-
cautionary note claiming the introduction of competition 
to the schemes delivery "will result in new administrative 
compliance and transaction costs" . However, the general 
policy statement claims these costs will be offset by: 
improved incentives on premium payers to prevent in-
juries 
more control for employers in managing workplace 
safety and improving rehabilitation for people with 
workplace injuries 
the ability for premium payers to choose an insurer who 
provides the services that best meet their needs 
increased focus on the claimants and the achievement 
of rehabilitation outcomes 
more efficient scheme management and accountability 
Greater discussions of the merits and flaws of the Bill would 
increase the value in making an assessment of the antici-
pated changes introduced by the Bill. The anticipated im-
pact of privatisation and conteslable delivery of employers 
third party liability requires informed consent as the New 
Zealand monopoly delivery has been proven the most cost-
effective in the world (Dewes, D. and Treblicock, M., 1992). 
It is quite apparent on examination of the Bill that the prin-
ciples of the 1972, 1982 and in part, 1992 acts have been 
removed. Instead, new principles introduced by the com-
petitive frame of the Bill introduces a 'market' philosophy. 
The 'market' driven principles are expressly contrary to 
the principles espoused in the Woodhouse Report. Further, 
there is ample evidence that New Zealand has the lowest 
costs in comparable terms 15 for the actual cost of ACC 
through current policies in a number of ways. The Bill as-
sumes flexibility of the worksite to meet the needs of the 
insurers - but does not indicate flexibility of the insurers to 
meet the needs of the contract between the insured and the 
worksite. 
Contractors were concerned that an 'open' market will simi-
larly separate large employers from smaller employers in 
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terms of the benefits of a privatised scheme. But the real 
question asked of the Special Select Committee was whether 
there is sufficient evidence that these inequities will change 
as anticipated by the Bill, with a competitive provision of 
employers' third party liability for personal injury in the 
workplace? It was contended that it is problematic for shear· 
ing contractors that, as is symptomatic of a private market, 
private providers (insurers) will compete for the obvious 
returns of larger employers. The contractors foresee the ef. 
feet of the Bill to be a 'creaming' of the market at the ex· 
pense of small employers in such high risk industries as 
the shearing industry. These argument are not new, as has 
been anticipated in previous criticism of privatising ACC 
(Duncan, 1994). 
As a wage intensive industry contractors fear three charac· 
teristics present at the emergence of the proposed competi· 
tive market will be burdens: their historically unsubstanti· 
ated classification; administrative inexperience in classifi· 
cation in the new market; and establishment contingency 
costs, with the effect of an increase on premiums/levies 
rather than a lowering of their transaction costs for liability 
cover. 
The historical 'tail' 
The current 'tail' is an example loaded onto contractors 
'risk', relative to those having previously exited the indus· 
try. Based on the inaccurate and incomplete data provided 
by the Corporation (ACC), contractors argue they shouldn't 
be paying levies, including wage replacement or rehabili· 
tation costs, for long since departed commercial competi· 
tors. Furthermore, such rating burdens employers entering 
the 'new' market with clearly inaccurate information and 
inadequate statistics from the current providers, resulting 
in insupportable 'tail' costs. Such concerns have been rein· 
forced recently by the Government releasing policy con· 
firming that employers will 'carry the costs of the tail'. 16 
The effect of that policy, in association with the anticipated 
outcomes of this Bill, do not meet the needs nor solve the 
problems that those in the wool industry have in delivery 
of real and equitable compensation for personal injury in 
New Zealand. There are unresolved complications as to 
the role of the unfunded liabilities of the scheme. A contra· 
dietary message sent to the industry in the terms of the Bill 
suggest that contractors ability to 'compete' will be unsus· 
tainable in the efficacy of a private market. 
The common law right to sue 
There are considerable doubts that the provision of corn· 
pensation for personal injury under the Bill will provide 
the legal environment for sustainable cover, and for the 
sustained statutory suspension of the common law right to 
sue. The right to sue for personal injury was abolished in 
favour of the Accident Compensation scheme in 197 4 be· 
cause litigation and private insurance cover was too ex· 
pensive and inefficient. Although the return to the individual 
right to sue is implicit in privatised 'markets' abroad, it is 
noteworthy that the Government has drafted legislation 
preventing such terms. Even the Business Roundtable as 
quoted by the Select Committee, acknowledge the suspen-
sion of the common law right to sue is a flaw in the Bill. 11 
It is of concern that the Bill could create the environment 
for a judicial challenge for the return of the right to sue to 
be a corollary of the new privatised market. On the face of 
the Bill it would appear that the claim would be on the 
insurer, not the employer. The other side of this equation, 
though, is that there is bound to be litigation over entitle· 
ments. However, it is unlikely that employers will be able 
to avoid getting dragged into disputes if the first port of 
call after the accident is the lawyer's office. There is no 
clear provision that an individual would be prevented from 
taking a private action for example under exemplary dam· 
ages for personal injury against a party to the 'insurance' 
contract were ·entitlement refused. 
'Risk-sharing' 
The shearing industry is at present classified high risk. The 
actual work site for these operations is the average 
woolshed, which is a site of minimum maintenance for most 
producers (farmers). Contractors express concern that the 
creation of a privatised market places contractors at risk 
for liability notwithstanding that risk is often a woolshed 
work site characteristic rather than a work practice liabil· 
ity. The consequence of that conflict of interest would po· 
tentially pit contractors against self·employed producers 
in terms of liability. Not only does the Bill encourage pri· 
vate insurers to 'double dip' as both will have mandatory 
premiums, but the Bill is unclear as to the relationship and 
liability of the multi·faceted relationship in the informal 
work sector. 
The need to "anchor" worker entitlements in detailed sched-
ules and regulations reduces the potential for flexible and 
different "products" .through which insurers compete. Flex-
ibility is reintroduced through "risk·sharing" .1R This is 
broadly defined, but it probably means that employers and 
insurers can agree on some son of "excess" arrangement 
(eg. the employer carries the first $x of cost in any year; 
the employer carries the cost of the first two weeks of corn· 
pensation not just one; the employer meets the cost of the 
first medical treatment). 19 The premium is reduced to rec· 
ognise the risk that the employer carries. The Bill provides 
that even if there is risk sharing, it is the insurer that is 
ultimately responsible for providing the entitlements. This 
is all very well, but if there is a dispute between an insurer 
and an employer over who should pay a part of any claim, 
the worker is the 'meat in the sandwich', and carries the 
risk of delays in resolving where liability falls. 
However the changes in the law will make contractors le-
gally liable to deliver statutory entitlements to employees. 
Even a neo·liberal response assuming less Government in 
business would find the element of compulsion on employ· 
ers to ensure their legal liability as an ominous and prob· 
lematic change of direction in Government policy. This el-
ement is a direct result of privatisation, since the Inland 
Revenue Service currently acts in a dual role simultaneous 
as both levy collector and enforcement agency. 
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The abandonment of the accredited employer scheme, the 
approved employer scheme and the experience rating sys· 
tern, although flawed in previously mentioned ways, have 
considered merit when measured against these new terms 
of a new regulatory bureaucracy to monitor compliance. It 
is debatable whether the changes proposed are in fact the 
most efficient and accountable processes for modification 
of the provision of workplace accident insurance. 
Accountability 
If the insurer goes out of business, the employer covers the 
cost of one year's premium20 and the rest of the industry is 
levied to pay the balance via an Insolvent Insurers Fund. 21 
Once again, this is a recipe for endless acrimony and liti· 
gation, where even the insurer has a problematic conflict 
with the Bill. Why should prudent insurers meet the finan· 
cial obligations of unsound competitors etc. and/or is the 
risk carried by the employer or worker? 
Such a critique echoes contractors' argument for real analy· 
sis of the 'tail' costs. 1his would also be unacceptable where 
compliance is at the expense of driving compliance costs 
for insurers onto the insured , in so doing minimising the 
rights of the purchaser of the cover, the employer. Increased 
premium costs incurred by the fully funded costs, because 
of the requirements of fully funded premiums and payments 
of 'on·going' claims, are likely. The appearance of choice 
for the purchase of liability cover is in fact operating by 
design as a 'compulsory' purchase of an 'insurance con-
tract'. A 'compulsory ' purchase of an 'insurance contract' 
is an anomaly. Is this not reversing the freedom of choice 
under the guise of a regulated compliance? 
Contrary to the anticipated provision that choice may refer 
to 'shop around' and 'bargain buys', it is of concern that 
this effect of the Bill will have an undesired long term out-
come of increasing costs of contractors' liability cover. 
Under the current Bill , an insurer will not be able to refuse 
to insure an applicant, and cannot void a policy for non-
disclosure or false information on which the ' insurance cost' 
is based. Th.is may result in short term employers 'costing' 
the industry similar to the establishment of the current ' tail ', 
except that insurers will use actuarial techniques to pass 
the collapsed cost onto other employers. Not only have these 
issues rewritten the fundamental premises of both insur-
ance and contract law in New Zealand, there is an added 
concern at the risk that insurance premiums will reflect both 
added costs and added risks of insurers establishing the 
market. As stated, compliance costs currently monitored 
by the Inland Revenue Department would be mirrored by 
an alternative structure to monitor the competitive market. 
The effect of privatising compliance costs merely creates 
another anomaly of 'accountability', which in fact forms a 
repetitious bureaucracy. 
Employers' autonomy 
The Bill would allow unscrupulous insurers to arrange the 
limits on cover to the detriment of businesses that operate 
within the law. It is inconceivable to allow insurers and 
workers to agree on the definition of accident, literally to 
'dump' the costs out of the employers' liability cover. This 
defeats the purpose of providing employers' third party li-
ability cover for personal injury in the workplace. There 
are two further problems: 
(i) manipulation of cover 
There will be no insurer of last resort. Insurers only have 
to quote (Clause 152). But they can quote a premium that 
is out of reach - knowing that the employer could not af· 
ford it. Agencies concentrate on the profitable segments of 
a market. For example, conventional consultant wisdom in 
banking is to deliberately price some products like retail 
counter services so high that customers will not use them. 
In this regime, the insurance industry makes pricing deci· 
sions that effectively decide which commercial practices 
and which industries and enterprises stay in business. But 
it is doing that in relation to an activity that is only a mar-
ginal dimension of the core business of the client 
(ii) not legally sustainable 
Some contractors have a problem with private insurers ap· 
pointing their own appeal officials. How can government 
expect employees to have a fair review of the cover em· 
players are guaranteed to provide, indeed are compelled to 
provide, if the review officer is a appointed and paid for by 
the insurance company? A better review system would be 
one which is independent of, and seen to be independent 
of, the insurer. Even if the ACC corporation had this role, 
it would give greater confidence than what is proposed. 
Another problem is if an employee uses a vehicle for work 
(as many of many shearing employees are required to do) 
and is injured doing so, it is a work related injury. There is 
little distinction between a motor vehicle and plant ma-
chinery in many of these cases. Clause 34(3) therefore not 
only goes against common sense but against some of the 
basic premises and rulings of torts Jaw and employment 
law. Employees (or their insurer) must take responsibility 
for these accidents. This subclause must be deleted. 
Future research 
State policy, through ACC, has determined the provision 
of employers' liability insurance and compensation exclu-
sively for the past twenty five years. On the eve of a door 
potentially opening to private, competitive provision of 
employers' liability insurance, the larger thesis research 
chronicles the failure of previous legislation, current legis-
lation (the ARCI) and the proposed Bill within the context 
of current social policy to meet the needs of the respective 
parties in the shearing industry. It is my contention that 
although privatisation of accident compensation may prom· 
ise benefits from private enterprise competition, may im· 
prove accountability and will no doubt provide choice for 
the individual employer, it will also reinforce the inequita-
ble liability basis for all parties in the New Zealand shear-
ing industry. The foundation for such a claim is that it would 
be incongruent for the suspended principle of common law 
liability of the present scheme to be retained in a privatised 
provision of worker's compensation. Other questions in· 
elude: Who benefits from the current arrangements? Whose 
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interests should be paramount?22 Should it be the injured 
or dependants in fatal accidents? Or those paying or under-
writing the levy? tntimately, the question on shearing con-
tractors lips is - will they benefit from privatisation? 
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The scheme thereafter is known as ACC. 
See also Dewes, D and Treblicock, M 'The Efficiency 
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ing Contractors Association (NZSCA) relied on sub-
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their submission: Don Rennie; Professor Ken 
Mckinnon; and Grant Duncan. The NZSCAand author 
of this paper acknowledge these points, where not spe-
cifically cross referenced from the NZSCA submission 
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Accident Insurance BilL 
15 These comparisons are reflected in the nations studied 
in the Canadian Worker's Compensation Review, 1996. 
16 Minister of Accident Compensation, Hon. Murray 
McCully 18 September 1998. 
17 Special Select Committee on Accident Insurance Bill, 
Parliament 11 November 1998. 
18 Clause 151, Accident Insurance Bil11998 as argued in 
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Waikato Law School, 30 October 1998. 
19 Ibid. 
20 !bid, Clause 209 
21 Ibid, Part 9, with its various provisions. 
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